By the end of the 1820s, an innovative product was introduced in the northern Italian editorial market: technical and popular periodicals offering “useful knowledge” to a larger audience composed of members of the provincial middle-class, clergymen, and modestly educated craftsmen. By examining their medical content, this paper shows that popularisation did not merely entail disseminating a set of stable, unanimous, and trustworthy medical doctrines; rather, it represented a crucial step in the making of science during a period in which medical (...) theories were still various and contradictory. Moreover, it demonstrates that the environmental and preventative approach to disease, which these medical contributors often employed, did reflect recent developments in chemical or physical knowledge and responded to pedagogical and informative goals; but it mostly served to affirm the social usefulness of medicine and the legitimacy of health professionals' participation in determining how to regulate more general epidemiologic, social, and political issues. (shrink)

The history of women has been defined by a world enmeshed in woes, frustration, oppression, maltreatment and inequalities. Feminism as a philosophy of change sought to fight, end and change this woeful scenario of women that denied their self respect, dignity and led to a loss of self confidence. Fundamentally, feminist philosophy sought for explanations and justifications why women were denied a voice and why they were historically not treated as coequals of men. The basis of inequality is historically rooted (...) in cultural and philosophical falsities that were not evidenced based but were used to justify oppression against women. The Universal Declaration of human rights gave women and the world the platform that empowered them with rights and led to fresh processes that sought to end oppression and their underdevelopment inspired by inequality, iniquities, denial of opportunities for growth and empowerment. The millennium development goal of ending inequality and oppression against women should achieve equality and women’s empowerment in Africa. Since the declaration of the MDGS, considerable gains had been made inAfricabut challenges and problems are still identified in the areas of cultural inequality complicated by the weakness of the major governance institutions and corruption. Other challenges centre on women’s lack of genuine empowerment, violence against women, trafficking in women, denial of human rights, lack of participation in policy and governance. Since empowerment is the key to achieving mainstreaming and gender equality, this paper seeks to redefine the concept of empowering women as the platform to ending inequality, social injustice and achieving equality in the context of the unique challenges of underdevelopment facingAfrica. It will identify the policy implications of establishing empowerment structures that address multiple challenges facing gender inequality and how these structures will assist in building the necessary feminine human resources that will make women as partners of sustainable growth and development after 2015. (shrink)

Este artículo es el resultado de una investigación del programa de Maestría en Educación de la universidad la Gran Colombia; se propuso como objetivo general determinar cómo construyen la categoría “valor” estudiantes de grado once de dos colegios de la ciudad de Bogotá, con edades que oscilan entre quince y diecinueve años respectivamente. El enfoque metodológico fue de carácter cualitativo en el cual se utilizaron las técnicas de recolección de información: grupos focales y entrevistas a profundidad, que tuvieron el propósito (...) de recoger e interpretar la asignación de sentidos y representaciones expresadas en las narrativas de los actores participantes. Algunos de los hallazgos sugieren que las percepciones de la población objeto de estudio sobre la categoría “valor” están relacionadas con procesos de subjetivación que se construyen en la vida cotidiana en dinámicas complejas y no necesariamente lineales, como resultados de acuerdos sociales. De otra parte, existe una tendencia significativa a construir la categoría “valor” de acuerdo con las necesidades, intereses y motivaciones que se generan en el contexto escolar, lo que produce conflictos, contradicciones y valoraciones morales que muchas veces devienen en lucha de fuerza con las instituciones. Se destaca entre otras conclusiones, el juego en que se sumergen los estudiantes a partir de prácticas éticas asociadas a la categoría “valor” de carácter teleológico, porque las conductas intentan evitar un castigo o alcanzar un premio; y autotélicas porque los comportamientos producen felicidad en el hacer. (shrink)

One can say that there is inadequate preparation, in Africa, to embrace the fourth industrial revolution. Two schools of thought argue as to the reason for this state of affair. While the Internalist school blames the situation on Africa’s culture and metaphysics, the Externalist school considers external factors as the ultimate explanation for Africa’s plight. We argue that both internal and external factors considered separately are not sufficient as the ultimate explanation for Africa’s lack of preparation, hence the need for (...) a multi-dimensional approach which offers more than the conventional wisdom but critically considers what constitutes a complex explanation and solution for Africa’s plight. Furthermore, we suggest that more attention should be paid to Africa’s existential situation if she must rise to take her place in the emerging revolution. The study initiates a conversation around the theme of Africa’s fate in the looming fourth industrial revolution using phenomenological methods of research. (shrink)

This article revisits the controversy between Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Balḫī. Based on the testimony of the Kitāb taṯbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa of the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, it is shown that the two philosophers must have clashed at the court of Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Marwazī, governor of Balḫ, during the 910s, and that the virulence of the tone of their exchange can be explained above all by this context of professional rivalry. In terms of content, their conversation must have (...) focused on the question of divine justice and on the best way to give an account of prophecy and Qurʾanic wisdom. We then turn to the study of chap. VIII, 4 of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Al-maṭālib al-ʿāliya and show that, contrary to a recently held view, this chapter constitutes an echo not of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, but of the first argument of Ibn al-Rāwandī's Kitāb al-zumurrud, which contrasted the autonomy of reason with the necessity of prophecy in order to conclude from the former to the negation of the latter. Finally, it is suggested that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's doctrine of prophecy, like that of the great theologians of his time, both Muʿtazilites and Ašʿarites, aims to escape the dilemma set up by Ibn al-Rāwandī a few decades earlier. (shrink)

In this review, we discuss the application of mouse models to the identification and pre‐clinical validation of novel therapeutic targets in colorectal cancer, and to the search for early disease biomarkers. Large‐scale genomic, transcriptomic and epigenomic profiling of colorectal carcinomas has led to the identification of many candidate genes whose direct contribution to tumourigenesis is yet to be defined; we discuss the utility of cross‐species comparative ‘omics‐based approaches to this problem. We highlight recent progress in modelling late‐stage disease using mice, (...) and discuss ways in which mouse models could better recapitulate the complexity of human cancers to tackle the problem of therapeutic resistance and recurrence after surgical resection. (shrink)

The research of the thermal state of workers is associated with s ome ethical difficulties. The research work uses the method of rewards and bonuses for respondents. This argues the relevance of the discussion about the ethical principles of conducting hygienic and physiological studies in conditions of manufacturing.

ome Remarks on the Crisis of Capitalism What are the causes and consequences of the crisis of capitalism ? What are the plausible scenarios forthe outcome of the crisis ? To what extent is the current crisis comparable to that of 1929, and to whatextent does it differ from the crisis of the 1970s ? To what extent can one speak of a crisis of neoliberalism ? These are some of the questions which the authors of The Crisis of Neoliberalism (...) address here. (shrink)

ome Remarks on the Crisis of Capitalism What are the causes and consequences of the crisis of capitalism ? What are the plausible scenarios forthe outcome of the crisis ? To what extent is the current crisis comparable to that of 1929, and to whatextent does it differ from the crisis of the 1970s ? To what extent can one speak of a crisis of neoliberalism ? These are some of the questions which the authors of The Crisis of Neoliberalism (...) address here. (shrink)

1 Since commentary on the M ideas t is s o fraugh t with controversy, let me state s ome of my s tarting p oints up front. I am a strong believer in a market economy, and in W estern civilization. My foreign p olicy instincts tend to be dovish, in recognition of the imperfections in governments, but I am not, like some libertarians , in principle oppo sed to A merican intervention abroad. I am not religious , and (...) the M iddle East holds no s pecial theological s ignificance fo r me. I h ave fo llowe d events in the region, and read wid ely on its h isto ry, but have no literacy in either Hebrew or Arabic. (shrink)

ome recent work by philosophers of mathematics has been aimed at showing that our knowledge of the existence of at least some mathematical objects and/or sets can be epistemically grounded by appealing to perceptual experience. The sensory capacity that they refer to in doing so is the ability to perceive numbers, mathematical properties and/or sets. The chief defense of this view as it applies to the perception of sets is found in Penelope Maddy’s Realism in Mathematics, but a number of (...) other philosophers have made similar, if more simple, appeals of this sort. For example, Jaegwon Kim (1981, 1982), John Bigelow (1988, 1990), and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990) have all defended such views. The main critical issue that will be raised here concerns the coherence of the notions of set perception and mathematical perception, and whether appeals to such perceptual faculties can really provide any justification for or explanation of belief in the existence of sets, mathematical properties and/or numbers. (shrink)

Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) a marqué l'histoire de la pensée économique en introduisant la modélisation des phénomènes économiques, et non leur seule quantification. Ce constat appelle une double question : 1° Comment la rupture opérée par Cournot s'inscrit-elle dans l'histoire et l'évolution des méthodes de l'économie? La question se pose d'autant plus que les Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses passèrent d'abord presque inaperçues. 2° Que reste-t-il aujourd'hui de ce tournant effectué par le «philosophe-géomètre»? Autrement dit, comment (...) penser l'actualité de l'œuvre économique de Cournot? Or, avant d'être un économiste, Cournot est d'abord mathématicien et philosophe. Comment son œuvre économique s'accorde-t-elle alors avec son activité de mathématicien, et comment prend-elle place dans sa réflexion philosophique, c'est-à-dire à la fois dans sa théorie de la connaissance et dans sa philosophie de l'action et de la décision? Comprendre la portée de l'œuvre économique de Cournot et sa place dans son œuvre multiforme, tel est le projet qui anime le présent ouvrage où économistes, philosophes, historiens des sciences et sociologue entrecroisent leurs approches de celui qui demeure l'un des économistes et des philosophes majeurs du XIXe siècle."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper addresses ways of arguing fors ome form of economic democracy from within a broadly Rawlsian framework. Firstly, one can argue that a right to participate in economic decision-making should be added to the Rawlsian list of basic liberties, protected by the first principle of justice. Secondly,I argue that a society which institutes forms of economic democracy will be more likely to preserve a stable and just basic structure over time, by virtue of the effects of economic democratization on (...) the development of an active, democratic character among citizens. Thirdly, I argue that a proper understanding of the demands of the difference principle shows that justice demands more than ex post redistribution, but also requires the ex ante redistribution of power and authority in economic life. This connects to Rawls’s discussion of the badness of inequality, and to his endorsement of a “property-owning democracy”. -/- My conclusion is that, even if we may doubt the success of this first Rawlsian argument,the second and third arguments are both successful, and together establish a strong Rawlsian case forseeing economic democratization as a requirement of justice. (shrink)

The article compares Pope Francis's encyclical “LAUDATO SI” (2015) and the report by the Club of Rome, “”ome On!: Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet” (2018), in how they harness the narrative potential of the concept of home. Both with overtly religious and entirely secular arguments, the narrative of our common home is presented as a possible alternative to the prevailing narrative of growth today. The metaphor of home possesses not only conceptual but also generative power to (...) offer concrete solutions to two of humanity's most pressing issues today: the problem of waste and the problem of climate change. The narrative of home activates the power of local places while simultaneously seeking global balance on a worldwide scale. The study focuses on how the narrative of home transforms the relationship with places and the balance between the local and the global. (shrink)

Muʻtazilite thinkers put forward the first systematic ideas for the relationship of essence and attributes, one of the most fundamental and complicated issues of Islamic theology, and comprehensive explanations to the question of God’s names. Although almost all the thinkers agreed on uṣūl al-khamsa, they differed in their approach to the principle of unity (tawḥīd). ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, who lived in the period when these approaches emerged, is a scholar who reveals his distinctive view of God’s names and attributes in (...) which heslightly differs from his contemporaries such as Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf, Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī and Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Naẓẓām from the Basran Muʻtazila, by his extreme opinions on the Muʻtazilite principle of tawḥīd. He is one of thefour principle thinkers who presented original opinions in the early Basran Muʻtazila. Also he is the only known student of Hishâm al-Fuwaṭī and constitutes the last major circle of this tradition of knowledge that ended after him. This article aims to reveal the relationship between essence and attributes, the names and attributes of God in a holistic and systematic way in the thought of ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān. Unfortunately, his works have not survived to the present day and has not received the attention he deserves. Since his views were scattered in the classic books, our study was focused primarily on these classical sources. The modern literature was not ignored, either. The relevant records, analysis and criticism were re-contextualized. According to ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, the view that “Allah is a thing” is the same with the view that “Allah is other (ghayr)”, he draws attention to a definite distinction between Allah and human beings. In his thought about the relationship between Allah and space, he rejects the idea that God could be related to space or anything spatial in order to refrain from an anthropomorphic conception of God. In the case of visibility (ru’ya) of Allah, he radically opposes the idea of “seeing Allah with the heart,” which was adopted by the majority of the Muʻtazila. He tries to solve the issue in his own terms by avoiding the terms essence (dhāt) and nafs in the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes. He reveals a unique classification of names and thus adopts the method of analogy. He does not accept essential attributes as the majority of the Mu’tazila did. On the other hand, he tacitly accepts that Allah’s names have their own meanings in a way that they are not merely words (aqvāl). By a true comparison or perfect analogy (fī ḥaqīqati’l-qıyās), while he rejects that God is ālim, qadīr etc., he tries to ground that human beings is ālim, qadīr etc. He does not admit that God is eternally samʻi and baṣīr. Without interpreting samʻi as His knowledge or baṣīr as His power, he accepts that each name has a distinctive functionality. He rejects the assumption that God knows conditionally. Regarding the issue of whether living beings are in the knowledge of Allah before they exist, it makes a dual distinction: “a direction that can be subject to the eternal knowledge” and “the direction in which it actually came to existence”. Because of his view of non-existent and creatures, Ibn al-Rāwandī and modern resources refer the view of the eternity of objects to him. However, when the relevant records are examined, it is seen that this claim is not valid. According to ‘Abbād, Allah is capable of creating possible things that he knows, although He does not create impossible things that he knows, even though He is capable of creating them potentially (bi-al-quwwa). Allah has not created evil, neither literally nor figuratively; so much so that He created only man, not faith and unbelief. It is not possible to talk about any good that he did not create. He defends the createdness of the Qur’an (Khalq al-Qur’ān) by saying that the Qur’ān was created of accidents. About God’s names, he states that God has the names indicating His relationship to the universe. He does not accept that in eternity He is a willing agent, creator etc. However, he also does not accept the otherwise. He emphasizes that creation is reserved only for Allah. On the other hand, according to him, Allah creates without secondary causes and thus does not create things for a specific purpose. Regarding the revealed attributes (or informative attributes, khabarī), he recites these expressions only when reading of the Quran.He states that these expressions should not be used for Allah under any circumstances. He avoids naming Allah as wakīl, kafīl, laṭīf, kā’in, fard and mutakallim as he says that the name wāḥid should be used only for praising Him. (shrink)

This essay on the social history of logic discusses arguments in the programmatic writings of Carnap/Neurath, but especially in the widely read book by Lillian Lieber, Mits, Wits and Logic (1947), where Mits is the man in the street and Wits the woman in the street. It was seriously argued that the intense study of formal logic would create a more rational frame of mind and have many beneficial effects upon the social and political life. This arose from the conviction (...) that most metaphysical conundrums, religious and political problems and even fanaticism had their root in the irrationality of ordinary discourse, which had to be replaced by the more logical “ideal language” of Principia Mathematica. The enthusiastic promotion of formal logic occurred at a time when it was widely thought that minds could be “made over”, “reprogrammed” by proper intervention. J.B. Watson, (who claimed that he taught the American woman to smoke) wrote that “[S]ome day we shall have hospitals devoted to helping us change our personality, because we can change the personality as easily as we can change the shape or our nose... I wish I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful individual we should make of every healthy child”. Thesecond part of the essay deals, not with the history of logic as a formal science, but with the social role it was thought to play from Francis Bacon on, during the Enlightenment, in Kant and in the 19th century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin MillerKhaled El-RouayhebLarry Benjamin Miller. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning 21. Cham: Springer 2020. Pp. xviii + 143. Hardback, €77.99.Very few unpublished PhD dissertations have had a formative influence on a field. One of the precious few is Larry Miller's Princeton dissertation from (...) 1984 on Islamic disputation theory. It proposed an original and compelling account of the development of the discipline, from the earliest extant Arabic works in the tenth century to the composition of classic madrasa handbooks in the late thirteenth century. It has been cited regularly in the past decades and has served as the starting point for all later studies of Arabic/Islamic dialectics in European languages. The fact that it has finally been published is a fitting tribute to a study that is even more admirable for having been written when many of the primary sources were still only available as manuscripts.Part of the explanation for why the dissertation was not published sooner may be that its author did not pursue an academic career. And as he states in a short preface, he has not kept abreast of all relevant studies and editions that have appeared since his dissertation. A thorough revision and update has therefore not been possible. Though some minor corrections and revisions have been made, the book is still by and large the influential 1984 dissertation, now made available with a short introduction by Walter Young, one of the leading younger scholars in the field, along with helpful indices of proper names and subjects.Miller's narrative begins with Arabic works on disputation (jadal) by a number of theologians from the late ninth and tenth centuries, such as Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. 911), [End Page 518] al-Ash'arī (d. 935), and the Karaite Jewish scholar al-Qirqisānī (d. ca. 960). The basic assumption was that a questioner (sā'il) would ask a claimant (mu'allil) (i) what his view is; (ii) what the ground or reason ('illa) for that view is; (iii) the appropriateness of the ground/reason for the view; and (iv) to verify the ground/reason by showing it to be commensurate with the view. The ground/reason for the theological dialecticians was standardly an entity or property, not a premise. The reasoning tended to be informal and analogical, as opposed to explicitly making syllogistic deductions from quantified premises.Parallel to this theological tradition of jadal, there was an Arabic Aristotelian tradition that took its point of departure from Aristotle's Topics, translated into Arabic more than once in the period from the late eighth to the early tenth centuries. Though also often referred to as jadal, this tradition, represented by the writings of al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (d. 1037), and Averroes (d. 1198), retained distinct features. It tended to deny any epistemic value to dialectics, instead seeing it as useful only insofar as it provided logical training. For the Aristotelian/Neoplatonic philosophers, the pursuit of truth was the preserve of demonstrative syllogism (burhān). Whereas the theological dialecticians envisaged a claimant (mu'allil) and a questioner (sā'il), with the burden of proof on the former, the philosophical tradition had a questioner (sā'il) seek, in the manner of Socratic elenchus, to elicit from a respondent (mujῑb) a series of answers that would allow the construction of a syllogism whose conclusion contradicted the respondent's initial position.From the time of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Islamic theologians tended to take over the syllogistic ideal of reasoning from the philosophers, perhaps explaining why theological writings on jadal trail off after the eleventh century. The informal, analogical jadal tradition continued, however, in the writings of Islamic jurists. From the eleventh century, scholars such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) and al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) wrote works on jadal in which the examples are disputes about questions of Islamic law and the disputants are partisans of the various legal schools. This tradition of what Miller calls "juristic dialectics" (74, 95) later adopted some... (shrink)

This dissertation is an analysis of the development of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The central concerns of the thesis are; treatises on the theoretical understanding of the concept of dialectic and argumentation theory, and how, in practice, the concept of dialectic, as expressed in the Greek classical tradition, was received and used by five communities in the Islamic intellectual camp. It shows how dialectic as an argumentative discourse diffused into five communities (theologicians, poets, grammarians, philosophers (...) and jurists) and how these local dialectics that the individual communities developed fused into a single system to form a general argumentation theory (adab al-bahth) applicable to all fields. I evaluate a treatise by Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d.702/1302), the founder of this general theory, and the treatises that were written after him as a result of his work. I concentrate specifically on work by Adud al-Din al-Iji (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) and analyze how each writer (from Samarqandi to Gelenbevî) altered the shape of argumentative discourse and how later intellectuals in the post-classical Islamic world responded to that discourse bequeathed by their predecessors. What is striking about the period that this dissertation investigates (from 1300-1800) is the persistence of what could be called the linguistic turn in argumentation theory. After a centuries-long run, the jadal-based dialectic of the classical period was displaced by a new argumentation theory, which was dominantly linguistic in character. This linguistic turn in argumentation dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in Iji's impressively prescient work on 'ilm al-wad'. This idea, which finally surfaced in the post-classical period, that argumentation is about definition and that, therefore, defining is the business of language—even perhaps, that language is the only available medium for understanding and being understood—affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question. The argumentative discourse that started with Ibn al-Rawandi in the third/ninth century left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history, which was then full of concepts, terminology and objectives from this discourse up until the late nineteenth century. From this perspective, Islamic intellectual history can be read as the tension between two languages: the "language of dialectic" (jadal) and the "language of demonstration" (burhan), each of which refer not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that could dramatically alter the interpretation of that history. (shrink)

In this article I try to show that the most deep level ontology can have rich meaning for our understanding of such practical and everyday phenomena as education and interaction. With this deep level ontology I mean the problem of universals. Starting from famous traditional stances of realism and nominalism, which both are for the modern theories of growth and Bildung, I continue to the third and more recently developed ontological theory, trope theory according to which the properties (qualities, relations (...) etc.) are real (unlike in nominalism) but not universal (like in realisms). Then I will take a closer look at the trope theory of CB Martin. According to it every causal event is an interaction event between simple or complex beings in which their existing dispositions may produce manifesting properties. This point of view is radically anti dualistic because that basic level causal interaction has in the simplified forms all the elements of semiotic, meaningful of mental activity of such complex beings likes humans and animals. Ome of the main general conclusions of the article is that all causal affections contain a kind of “interpretation” from the side of affected object. (shrink)

I n th e inte r na l histo r y o f Zapatism o th e mos t remarka b l e featur e i s th e symbiotic proces s w hic h occur s bet w ee n th e Zapatist a gue r rilla s i n th e mountain s o f Chiapa s an d the indigenou s peopl e i n th e communities . Th e fo r me r g i v (...) e milita r y inst r uctio n t o th e latte r , w hil e sl o w ly adoptin g thei r v alue s an d ideol o g y . I n th e en d , bot h fo r m a n ew milita r y o r ganization , th e Zapatist a A r m y o f Nationa l Liberation . Thi s a r m y i s uniqu e compared wit h othe r milita r y o r ganizations , a s i t act s on ly defens i v e ly t o protec t indigenou s rights an d i t i s no t a n independenc e m o v ement , autonomou s i n it s functioning , l e gitimat e and l e gal , wit h a hig h representatio n o f w ome n ( w h o especial ly singl e ou t thi s o r ganization), mad e u p o f socia l suppo r t base s an d a traine d an d discipline d militia , strong ly suppo r ted by c i vi l societ y , h a vin g a radica l leftis t ideol o g y , w hic h remain s i n constan t rebellio n and resistanc e t o pressure s fro m th e authorities , th e M e xica n a r m y an d paramilitaries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Steinmann INTRINSIC MERIT AND MULTICULTURALISM O OME proponents of multiculturalism argue as follows: There is no such thing as intrinsic merit. Therefore, the hegemony ofwestern culture in America is not due to its intrinsic merit. Therefore, it is due only to the political and economic power of white Americans of European ancestry, especially males. Therefore, it might yield to a new order in which all cultures represented in (...) America, whatever dieir origin, have equal authority, influence, and status in schools, colleges, and universities, in theaters and concert halls, in museums and galleries, and in libraries. Is this a good argument for multiculturalism? I propose to examine not only its validitybutits assumptions and what impels diese multiculturalists to make it. Is there such a thing as intrinsic merit? A famous and influential argument that there is—W K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley's "The Affective Fallacy" (1949)—argues that the merit (or lack of merit) of literature, and by extension the other arts, is intrinsic. Actually—what comes to much the same thing—this essay attacks die belief that merit is extrinsic, in particular that it inheres in effects upon readers. The Affective Fallacy, they claim, "is a confusion between the poem [where poem is synecdoche for work of literature] and its results (what it is and Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 253-264 254Philosophy and Literature what it does).... It begins by trying to derive die standards of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism." The standards ofcriticism ought to be derived, Wimsatt and Beardsley say, from "cognitive analysis ofparadox, ambiguity, irony, and symbol"—that is, intrinsic features of the poem itself. Are Wimsatt and Beardsley right? I think not. For one tiling, the weight of opinion, of both critics and writers, is against diem. For Aristode, the point of a tragedy was to arouse pity and fear in the audience. For Horace, die point of poetry was to please and instruct readers (dulce et utile). For Dickens, die point of his novels was to make readers laugh and cry. For Henry James, every choice he made as a novelist—of characters, incidents, setting, point ofview—he made widi effects upon readers in mind. Even for Romantic poets, diough die merit of a poem did not lie in its effects upon readers, it did not lie in its intrinsic features either, but in its effects upon the poet himself (for Wordswordi, occasioning "die spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings "). Indeed, not until the advent, in the late thirties, of the school of which Wimsatt and Beardsley were die chief theoreticians—die New Criticism—did critics locate merit in intrinsic features. Critics and writers, of course, often speak of intrinsic features but only, as James does, to relate them to somediing extrinsic. Aristode, for instance, says diat a tragedy can arouse pity and fear only if its hero is a person of middling virtue who undeservedly goes from good fortune to bad in die course of the play. Books of literature are created by humans for humans, and whatever merit (or lack of merit) they may have humans confer upon them. Far from being an intrinsic merit, paradox or ambiguity or irony or symbol or any intrinsic feature of a work is no merit at all unless readers count it as a merit; readers may disagree about whether it is a merit (the relativism thatWimsatt and Beardsley deplore) ; every standard to which diey may appeal to settle disputes is a standard created by humans; and they may have various reasons for counting it as a merit (or a defect). The most common reason, of course, commits the Affective Fallacy: the feature affects readers in a way they find desirable. (As I shall note later, in section III, diere can be other reasons less direcdy related to the effect of the work.) It is not easy for readers (or theorists of literary value) to sayjust what die effect is ofan intrinsic feature or why readers count this effect as desirable or even what feature of the work causes this effect. But, though Wimsatt and Beardsley, in arguing dieir case for the Affective Fallacy, make... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LONERGAN'S "CRITICAL REALISM" AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM TIMOTHY R. STINNETT University of Detroit Mercy Detroit, Michigan THE PHENOMENON of religious pluralism is raising ome basic questions for philosophical thought that must e faced not only by philosophies not linked to any particular religious tradition but also by the theologies or philosophies of specific religious traditions. Christian theologians seem first to have discovered the range of questions raised by religious pluralism (...) in the face of apparently conflicting truth claims. No less important, however, are certain moral questions: how the advocates of the various religious traditions should bear witness to their respective traditions, and how they should go about identifying and correcting the ideological biases that seem inevitably to occur as the result of the historical and cultural conditions in which their respective witnesses emerge and develop. Thus, a philosophical treatment of religious pluralism will need to make explicit the relevant conditions of truth by which religious claims must be assessed. It will also need to clarify how apparently conflicting truth claims may be examined to see whether they are genuinely conflicting and then how genuinely conflicting truth claims may be adjudicated. Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of critical realism may be considered a valuable resource for addressing such questions insofar as he undertakes to answer such fundamental questions as " What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? " 1 Attention to these questions 1 Bernard Lonergan, Method vn Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 25. See also Bernard Lonergan, A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard I. F. Lonergan, S.J., edited by Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 210. 97 98 TIMOTHY R. STINNETT promises clarification about how religious truth claims may be shown to be true (and thus to count as " knowledge ") and how genuinely conflicting truth claims may be adjudicated. It also promises to clarify how one may recognize ideological bias and correct for it in a fully reflective understanding of a particular religious witness. For Lonergan, answers to the three questions cited above provide respectively a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics, all three of which together constitute his philosophy of critical realism.2 In this essay I will explore the relevance of his critical realism for philosophical treatment of questions raised by religious pluralism. After an analysis of the salient features of Lonergan's philosophy, I will consider the disadvantages and advantages it affords a philosophy of religious pluralism. By attending to the disadvantages I will register an immanent criticism of Lonergan's critical realism, and I will atexplain how it must be revised in order to become a useful resource for treating philosophical questions raised by religious pluralism. Lonergan's "Critical Realism" The human capacity to know is for Lonergan what constitutes human being as spirit. " Let us say," he writes, that intelligibility that is not intelligent is material, and that intelligibility that is intelligent is spiritual.... But inasmuch as we are spiritual, we are orientated towards the universe of being, know ourselves as parts within that universe, and guide our living by that knowledge.8 Knowing, then, is a process with distinguishable moments, and it is completed in action consistent with what is known. Moreover, what can be known by a human subject determines the parameters of "proportionate being." The coordination of all of the departments of human knowledge is the object of metaphysics, 2 Method in Theology, pp. 25, 83, 261, 316. See also Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, revised ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 322ff., p. 350. a Insight, p. 516. LONERGAN ON RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 99 which Lonergan defines as " the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being." 4 Proportionate being is not, however, a comprehensive term for everything that exists ; there is also "transcendent being." Transcendent being is revealed as mystery, and knowledge of it is obtained through the operation of grace in religious conversion.5 But I will postpone discussion of this knowledge of transcendent being for the moment. The orientation of the human spirit toward " the universe of being" manifests itself in "the primordial drive" to know. "It... (shrink)

La mente non è sempre esistita ma è stata inventata: inventata nel senso che, a un certo punto, qualcuno ha introdotto il concetto di mente. Chi lo abbia introdotto per primo è una questione controversa. Per esempio, Putnam a f f er ma c he , a nc he s e «i n que s t os e c ol os i pa r l a c ome s e l a me nt e f os s e qua s (...) i un’ i de a autoevidente», nondimeno la nozione attuale di mente «non è molto antica, o almeno la sua Ce r t o, «l e pa r ol e ‘ me nt e ’ e ‘ a ni ma ’ , o a l me no i l or o a nt e na t i egemonia non è molto antica».1.. (shrink)

La fiction historique dont nous parlons ici a vu le jour par rapport à la pensée de l'écriture, ou de l'inscription, telle qu'elle a eu lieu dans le travail de Jacques Derrida des années 60. Au coeur de ce travail, il y a trois textes publiés en 1967 : La voix et le phénomène, De la grammatologie, L'écriture et la différence. Traverser ces travaux revient à traverser : premièrement, l'imagination du mot, qui n'était pour Husserl que pure fiction ; deuxièmement, (...) l'imagination comme séparation de la nature dans la nature chez Rousseau ; et troisièmement, la fiction comme imaginaire dans le cas du structuralisme littéraire, au-delà duquel a lieu la fiction sans imaginaire de Mallarmé. Juste avant ces travaux il y a, dans l'oeuvre publiée, le moment où la fiction historique commence à percer ; juste après, le moment où ses fondements ont déjà été établis : l''Introduction' à L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl et 'La double séance' dans La dissémination, respectivement. C'est également l'espace compris entre le problème de l'historicité et celui d'une littérature sans condition. À cet espace appartient la possibilité de 'devenir une chose littéraire' de tout texte 'confié à l'espace public [...] dont le contenu, le sens, le référent, le signataire et le destinataire ne sont pas des réalités pleinement déterminables, des réalités à la fois non-fictives ou pures de toute fiction...' (Donner la mort)."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This is the first study to compare the philosophical systems of secular scientific philosopher Mario Bunge (1919-2020), and Moroccan Islamic philosopher Taha Abd al-Rahman (b.1945). In their efforts to establish the philosophical underpinnings of an ideal modernity these two great thinkers speak to the same elements of the human condition, despite their opposing secular and religious worldviews. While the differences between Bunge’s critical-realist epistemology and materialist ontology on the one hand, and Taha’s spiritualist ontology and revelational-mystical epistemology on the other, (...) are fundamental, there is remarkable common ground between their scientific and Islamic versions of humanism. Both call for an ethics of prosperity combined with social justice, and both criticize postmodernism and religious conservatism. The aspiration of this book is to serve as a model for future dialogue between holders of Western and Islamic worldviews, in mutual pursuit of modernity’s best-case scenario. (shrink)

Les mathématiques constituent pour Nicolas de Cues (1401-1464) une discipline intellectuelle clé. Elles sont d'une part la manifestation la plus nette et la plus parfaite de la fécondité de la raison qui s'exprime en elles comme dans sa forme symbolique essentielle, et d'autre part elles constituent la porte d'entrée vers la métaphysique. Celle devrait en toute logique s'appeler d'ailleurs métamathématique plutôt que métaphysique, terme qui ressortit davantage à la tradition aristotélicienne à laquelle Nicolas de Cues préférait manifestement une filiation pythagoricienne (...) et platonicienne. Les études rassemblées dans ce volume abordent différentes thématiques liées à ces deux axes: conception de l'espace géométrique, méthodes mathématiques concrètes pour aborder le problème de la quadrature du cercle, statut du point, méthode des proportions, approche mathématique de l'Un, mathématiques et doctrine trinitaire, et bien d'autres thématiques sont ici abordées et traitées par une équipe de spécialistes. (shrink)

Athée de système, athée vertueux, Spinoza a disparu sous le spinozisme, lui-même réduit à une forme d'athéisme, buteur a voulu poser la question de cette résistance à l'Éthique et retrouver Spinoza sous le spinozisme. Il fallait pour cela être dans l'Éthique, dans un livre dont l'écriture more geometrico cache un déplacement inédit. Chez les adversaires de Spinoza, la résistance au texte montre que Spinoza institue un mode nouveau et inouï de positionnement du lecteur. À la lecture de l'Éthique, on comprendra (...) ce que signifie pour le sujet, être effet de texte : le lecteur est construit par sa lecture, ce qui configure une théorie du sujet absolument nouvelle. Il fallait partir des réfutations de Spinoza pour mesurer, contre le prestige du cogito cartésien et de sa méthode, ce que peut être l'assujettissement du moi à un ordre dont il est l'effet et non le principe. Et ordre se prend en deux sens. Ordre de l'infini actuel auquel la puissance du sujet s'intègre, or en proférant une imputation de spinozisme, les adversaires de Spinoza ont privilégié une théorie de la substance sans travailler sur une théorie de la puissance. Ordre d'un livre jouant de la géométrie comme d'une rhétorique et qui procède par allers et retours. Se placer dans l'Éthique pour la lire, c'est assumer cette détermination du lecteur se constituant par ces déplacements réitérés. L'ordre de la lecture est infini et symbolise avec l'infini actuel dont il est l'effet "--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La logique de l'infini (Texte de juillet 1909)--La morale et la science.--L'évolution des lois.--Les rapports de la matière et de l'éther.--La logique de l'infini; (Texte du 3 mai 1912)--L'espace et le temps.--L'hypothèse des quanta.--L'union pour l'éducation morale.--Pourquoi l'espace a trois dimensions.--Appendice: Les fondements de la géométrie. Cornot et les principes du calcul infinitésimal. Le libre examen en matière scientifique. Le démon d'Arrhénius.

Charles Renouvier se bat contre les mystères et la métaphysique en utilisant la méthode scientifique. Il appuie son néocriticisme sur l'esprit de la science. Il n'omet pas d'étudier les premiers principes des sciences, les notions de phénomène et de loi, les catégories. Il articule son phénoménisme entre les catégories de relation, d'où découle l'absurdité de l'infini actuel, et de personne, toute chose étant par le biais de représentations. Il use des principes de relativité et de contradiction, propose un classement des (...) sciences, prenant en compte ses principes et posant la critique comme tronc commun des sciences. Il voit l'objet des mathématiques dans le rapport du multiple à l'un, et le nombre comme un tout d'unités. Sa loi du nombre lui permet de sortir des antinomies kantiennes, de penser les nombres négatifs et fractionnaires. Il analyse les concepts élémentaires de la géométrie, il présente les enjeux du calcul des probabilités et se positionne par rapport aux géométries imaginaires, tout cela en vue de débarrasser les mathématiques de toute métaphysique. Il fait valoir l'hypothèse scientifique dans les sciences expérimentales, s'interroge sur les notions de matière et de force. Considérant la place de la liberté et de la volonté en l'homme, il y voit une différence spécifique d'avec l'animal. Il montre le lien entre croyance et savoir, et il milite pour une religion raisonnée et un progrès moral."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Le 'Timée' est incontestablement le dialogue de Platon le plus cité dans l'Antiquité, le plu lu et le plus commenté. Tenu pour la "bible" des médio-platoniciens, il a joui d'une faveur extraordinaire, comme en témoignent les multiples commentaires qui ont vu le jour dans la pensée grecque, de Crantor à Proclus. Cette abondance d'études s'explique par deux raisons principales, intimement liées. D'un côté, le 'Timée', récit qui traite de la "création" du monde et de celle de l'homme, est un texte (...) difficile, exemple paradigmatique de l'obscurité que les auteurs anciens attribuaient à Platon, de l'autre, en proposant un modèle d'univers physique, il se présente comme un traité de cosmologie, le premier en fait à nous être parvenu, et offre une véritable somme des connaissances humaines où interviennent également la psychologie et la métaphysique, une encyclopédie scientifique dont la brièveté même exigeait d'emblée des éclaircissements et des explications préliminaires pour qui ne possédait pas une solide culture scientifique. Ce qui ressortit à la cosmogonie et à la psychogonie est en effet associé aux quatre sciences "mathématiques" (arithmétique, géométrie, musique, astronomie), et pour ce qui se rapporte à l'homme et à l'anthropologie le texte platonicien fait intervenir en outre des sciences comme l'optique ou la médecine. On peut donc comprendre que le caractère "mythique" de l'énoncé et sa dimension scientifique aient constitué autant d'éléments de nature à désarçonner un lecteur non averti. L'importance de cet écrit explique par ailleurs qu'on en trouve de très nombreuses traces dans le monde latin, notamment médiéval, où les traductions fragmentaires et les commentaires sur le 'Timée' servent, entre autres, à l'exégèse biblique. De surcroît, à la Renaissance l'Occident retrouve l'héritage hellène, et les humanistes ont à leur disposition les traditions grecque et latine du "dialogue. (shrink)